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PRECEDENTIAL 
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_______________ 
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_______________ 
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DETECTIVE EDWARD CONWAY;  
DETECTIVE C. LISSNER;  
DETECTIVE RANDY SIDORSKI; 
JOHN DOES 1-10, unknown supervising 
officers in the Somerset Prosecutor's Office 
 
     Detective Edward Conway; Detective C. Lissner; 
Detective Randy Sidorski, 
               Appellants 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-12-cv-01040) 
District Judge:  Hon. Freda L. Wolfson 
_______________ 
 
Argued March 14, 2016 
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Eric S. Pasternack  [ARGUED] 
Lisa A. Puglisi 
Office of Attorney General of New Jersey 
P.O. Box 112 
25 Market Street 
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 
Trenton, NJ 08625 
 
 Counsel for Appellants 
 
Catherine M. Aiello   [ARGUED] 
Natalie J. Kraner 
Megan B. Treseder 
Lowenstein Sandler LLP 
65 Livingston Avenue 
Roseland, NJ 07068 
 
 Counsel for Appellee 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
                                              
 Honorable Julio M. Fuentes assumed senior status on July 
18, 2016. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Rashied Goodwin was arrested pursuant to a warrant 
for allegedly selling heroin to an undercover police officer.  A 
grand jury indicted him but the charges were eventually 
dropped.  Goodwin then brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
lawsuit for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution 
against the three detectives involved in securing his arrest 
warrant.  He claims that the detectives submitted a false 
warrant application because they knew or should have known 
that he was in jail at the time of one of the undercover drug 
deals.  He argues that his incarceration was evident from a 
booking sheet the detectives had when they applied for his 
arrest warrant.  The detectives moved for summary judgment 
and asserted a qualified immunity defense.  
  
 The District Court denied the detectives’ motion, 
holding that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the 
detectives possessed the booking sheet when they submitted 
the warrant application, which precluded granting summary 
judgment on the issue of whether the detectives had probable 
cause to arrest Goodwin.  According to the District Court, the 
detectives’ qualified immunity defense also hinged on this 
factual dispute. 
  
 At oral argument before this Court, defense counsel 
conceded that the detectives were indeed aware of the 
booking sheet before submitting the warrant application.  The 
only issue we must decide is whether that booking sheet and 
any inferences derived therefrom preclude a finding of 
probable cause.  We conclude that they do not.  Despite the 
booking sheet, the detectives had probable cause when they 
applied for Goodwin’s arrest warrant, and they are therefore 
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entitled to qualified immunity.  Accordingly, we will reverse 
the order of the District Court.  
 
I.   
 
A.   
 
 In late September 2009, the Somerset County 
Organized Crime and Narcotics Task Force learned from a 
confidential informant that an individual known as “Snipe” 
was selling heroin in the Watchung/North Plainfield area of 
New Jersey.  At some point during the week of September 27, 
2009, Detective Lissner, acting undercover, accompanied the 
confidential informant to buy heroin from Snipe in a Sears 
parking lot in Watchung at approximately 3:30 p.m.  Snipe 
approached Lissner’s car and handed the drugs to the 
confidential informant through the front passenger side 
window.  Lissner asked Snipe if he could make future buys 
from him without the confidential informant present.  Snipe 
said that was fine and gave Lissner his cell phone number.  In 
his follow-up report, Detective Lissner described Snipe as a 
“black male.”1   
 
 Through a series of phone calls and text messages, 
Detective Lissner set up a second buy from Snipe on October 
16, 2009, again in the Sears parking lot.  This time, Snipe sat 
down in the front passenger seat of Lissner’s car and handed 
Lissner the drugs.  Following the exchange, Snipe drove out 
of the parking lot and headed towards Plainfield.  Detective 
Lissner provided no physical description of Snipe in his 
follow-up report. 
                                              
1 App. 334. 
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 Two other members of the Task Force, Detective 
Conway and Detective Sidorski, observed the drug deals from 
afar.2  No pictures or videos of Snipe were taken.  The most 
detailed physical description of Snipe is found in Detective 
Conway’s investigation report of the first buy: “black male, 
dark complexion, approximately 5’8, thin build, and 
approximately 30 years old.”3   
 
 The Task Force worked to identify “Snipe.”  They 
contacted Lieutenant O’Brien in the Plainfield Police 
Department, who advised the detectives that he knew “Snipe” 
as Rashied Goodwin.  In his deposition, O’Brien testified that 
he had previously interacted with Goodwin “on the street,” 
and that the only person he knew who uses the alias “Snipe” 
is Goodwin.4   
 
 On November 13, 2009, Detective Conway obtained a 
photograph of Goodwin from the Union County jail.  His 
investigation report indicates that he reached out to staff at 
the jail because he learned that Goodwin had recently been 
arrested and was being held there.  Detective Conway showed 
a copy of Goodwin’s photograph to Detective Lissner, who 
positively identified Goodwin as the “Snipe” who sold him 
drugs.  Lissner then initialed and dated the photograph to 
confirm that he identified Goodwin as Snipe.  In his 
deposition, Lissner testified that he “immediately recognized” 
the individual in the photograph as the person from whom he 
                                              
2 Detective Conway observed both drugs deals, and Detective 
Sidorski observed the second drug deal.  App. 332-38; App. 
326 ¶ 61. 
3 App. 333. 
4 App. 256-57 (O’Brien Dep. 23:20-21, 25:2-5). 
6 
 
bought drugs, and that he would not have initialed the 
photograph unless he was “a hundred percent sure” about the 
identification.5 
 
 The detectives prepared an affidavit of probable cause 
for Goodwin’s arrest.  The affidavit itself refers only to the 
second drug buy on October 16, 2009.  But the affidavit was 
submitted with a packet of supporting documents that 
included, among other things: (1) the detectives’ investigation 
reports describing the first and second drug buys, (2) a 
supplementary investigation report explaining that the 
Plainfield Police Department indicated “Snipe” may be 
Rashied Goodwin’s alias and that Detective Lissner positively 
identified a photograph of Goodwin as Snipe, and (3) a copy 
of the photograph of Goodwin with Detective Lissner’s 
initials.    
 
 On November 25, 2009, a warrant was issued for 
Goodwin’s arrest.  Because Goodwin was incarcerated on 
other charges at the time, Detective Conway faxed the arrest 
warrant to Union County jail as a detainer.  Goodwin was 
unaware of these charges until the end of December 2009, 
when he was released from custody and then immediately re-
arrested.  In January 2010, a grand jury returned an 
indictment for Goodwin, charging him with knowingly and 
purposefully distributing heroin, and with distributing heroin 
within 1,000 feet of a school.   
 
 Some time after the indictment was issued, Goodwin 
told his public defender that he had been incarcerated from 
                                              
5 App. 153 (Lissner Dep. 119:3-5, 20-22). 
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September 26, 2009 through [].6  At the time Goodwin made 
this claim, his attorney did not know the date of the first drug 
buy because the investigation reports included with the 
affidavit state only that the first buy occurred “during the 
week of September 27, 2009.”7  Goodwin’s attorney asked 
the prosecutor for the exact date of the first drug buy, 
explaining that it was “essential to [his] client’s defense.”8  
The prosecutor refused to disclose this information, however, 
in an attempt to protect the identity of the confidential 
informant.  Rather than reveal the informant’s identity, the 
prosecutor dropped the charges, and Goodwin was released 
from jail.  The parties now agree that the date of the first drug 
buy was [].   
 
 The dispute in this case concerns a booking sheet from 
the Plainfield Police Department in Goodwin’s Somerset 
County case file.9  The booking sheet, which is undated, 
indicates that Goodwin was arrested and detained on 
September 26, 2009.10  Next to “Offender Disposition” is the 
word “JAILED,” and next to “Time bailed or released” is a 
                                              
6 Per agreement of the parties, the Court has redacted certain 
dates which appear as "[ ]" in this opinion. 
7 App. 332.  The week of September 27, 2009 ran from 
Sunday, September 27 through Saturday, October 3. 
8 App. 302. 
9 Although defense counsel conceded that the detectives 
possessed the booking sheet at the time they submitted 
Goodwin’s warrant application, it is unclear from the record 
whether the booking sheet was actually included in the 
application itself.  As we will later explain, this ambiguity is 
irrelevant. 
10 App. 340. 
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blank line.11  The booking sheet describes Goodwin as a black 
male, 31 years old, five feet six inches tall, and 150 pounds.12  
Notably, the sheet lists Goodwin’s nickname as “Snipe.”13   
 
B.   
 
 Goodwin brought this § 1983 action against Detective 
Conway, Detective Lissner, and Detective Sidorski 
(“Defendants”) for false imprisonment and malicious 
prosecution.  The crux of Goodwin’s claim is that Defendants 
omitted from the warrant application “potential alibi” 
information derived from the Plainfield booking sheet 
regarding his incarceration on the date of the first drug buy.  
Neither party disputes that the “Snipe” who sold drugs to the 
undercover officer in the first drug buy was the same “Snipe” 
who sold drugs in the second drug buy.  Thus if Goodwin was 
incarcerated during the first drug buy, he could not have been 
the “Snipe” involved in the second drug buy. 
 
 Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that they had probable cause to arrest Goodwin and that, even 
if the court found no probable cause, they would still be 
entitled to qualified immunity.  The District Court denied 
Defendants’ motion, and Defendants appealed.14 
                                              
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
A “district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to 
the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable 
‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
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II.  
 
 In this case, Defendants challenge the District Court’s 
conclusion that the existence of a particular factual dispute 
precluded summary judgment on the issue of whether 
Defendants had probable cause to arrest Goodwin.  In our 
view, this is a legal issue, not a factual one.15  As we have 
explained, the factual dispute on which the District Court 
rested its opinion—whether Defendants possessed the 
Plainfield booking sheet before submitting Goodwin’s 
warrant application—is no longer in dispute and indeed, has 
been resolved in Goodwin’s favor.  Nonetheless, because we 
conclude that the booking sheet was immaterial to the 
                                                                                                     
notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.”  Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).  We may therefore decide 
an appeal challenging the district court’s decision on whether 
the defendant’s alleged actions violated a constitutional right 
or whether the right was clearly established.  Id. at 528.  We 
may not, however, decide an appeal challenging the district 
court’s determination of “evidence sufficiency, i.e., which 
facts a party may, or may not, be able to prove at trial.”  
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995). 
15 See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 
(2014) (“[The defendants] contend that their conduct did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment and, in any event, did not 
violate clearly established law.  Thus, they raise legal issues; 
these issues are quite different from any purely factual issues 
that the trial court might confront if the case were tried.”).   
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probable cause determination, we will reverse the District 
Court’s decision on the issue of qualified immunity.16 
 
III.  
 Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity 
unless their conduct violated a clearly established 
constitutional right.17  Thus, to resolve a claim of qualified 
immunity, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry: 
(1) whether the plaintiff has shown the violation of a 
constitutional right, and (2) whether the right was “clearly 
established” at the time of the official’s conduct.18  Here, 
Goodwin claims that Defendants arrested, detained, and 
initiated criminal proceedings against him without probable 
cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.19  A finding of 
probable cause is therefore a complete defense to Goodwin’s 
constitutional claims, and, accordingly, would entitle 
Defendants to qualified immunity. 
 
 “[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and 
circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to 
believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the 
                                              
16 We exercise plenary review of orders rejecting qualified 
immunity at the summary judgment stage.  Wright v. City of 
Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 599 (3d Cir. 2005). 
17 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
18 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). 
19 The Fourth Amendment provides that people are “to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, . . . and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
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person to be arrested.”20 While the question of probable cause 
is generally left to the jury, a court may conclude that 
probable cause exists as a matter of law “if the evidence, 
viewed most favorably to [the nonmoving party], reasonably 
would not support a contrary factual finding.”21  “A ‘common 
sense’ approach [must be taken] to the issue of probable 
cause’ and a determination as to its existence must be based 
on the ‘totality of the circumstances.’”22 
 
                                              
20 Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
21 Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997). 
22 Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 
810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
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A.  False Arrest/Imprisonment 
 
 Goodwin’s main contention is that Defendants 
submitted a false warrant application and had no probable 
cause to arrest him.  Specifically, Goodwin claims that the 
booking sheet that Defendants had in their possession made 
clear that he was in jail when the first drug sale to Detective 
Lissner took place.  We note, however, that the supporting 
documents attached to the affidavit of probable clause 
included a detailed description of the investigation of 
“Snipe,” explained that another law enforcement officer 
indicated that “Snipe” may be Goodwin, and explained that 
Detective Lissner positively identified a photograph of 
Goodwin as “Snipe,” the person from whom he bought drugs.  
This information was sufficient to lead a reasonable person to 
believe Goodwin had committed the offense. 
 
 The mere existence of an arrest warrant, however, does 
not shield an officer from liability for false arrest.  In Wilson 
v. Russo,23 we explained that “a plaintiff may succeed in a 
§1983 action for false arrest made pursuant to a warrant if the 
plaintiff shows, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that 
the police officer ‘knowingly and deliberately, or with a 
reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or 
omissions that create a falsehood in applying for the warrant;’ 
and (2) that ‘such statements or omissions are material, or 
necessary, to the finding of probable cause.’”24 Omissions 
and misrepresentations are “material” if a reconstructed 
warrant application containing the alleged omissions and 
                                              
23 212 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 2000). 
24 Id. at 786-87 (quoting Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 399). 
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excising the alleged inaccuracies would no longer establish 
probable cause.25   
 
 Goodwin does not argue that Defendants deliberately 
or recklessly omitted the booking sheet itself from the warrant 
application.  Rather, he argues that the existence of the 
booking sheet—which Defendants concede they possessed 
before submitting the application—provides evidence from 
which a reasonable jury could infer that Defendants knew or 
should have known that Goodwin was incarcerated on the 
date of the first drug buy.  Goodwin argues that had this 
“potential alibi” information been included in the warrant 
application, it would have seriously undermined a finding of 
probable cause. 
 
 Goodwin’s argument rests on two alternative 
assertions: (1) the booking sheet is plainly exculpatory, 
or (2) Defendants had a duty to further investigate Goodwin’s 
whereabouts on the date of the first drug buy.  Both are 
unconvincing.   
 
 First, the booking sheet was not plainly exculpatory.  
We have explained that “[a]n officer contemplating an arrest 
is not free to disregard plainly exculpatory evidence, even if 
substantial inculpatory evidence (standing by itself) suggests 
that probable cause exists.”26  In Reedy v. Evanson,27 for 
example, we concluded that an officer disregarded plainly 
exculpatory evidence when he submitted an arrest warrant 
                                              
25 Id. at 789.  
26 Id. at 790 (quoting Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th 
Cir. 1999)). 
27 615 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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application that charged the defendant with falsely reporting a 
crime, yet knowingly omitted from the application the fact 
that a very similar crime occurred shortly after the crime he 
claimed the defendant had fabricated.28  We have also 
explained that, while a victim witness’s positive identification 
is usually sufficient to establish probable cause, plainly 
exculpatory evidence, such as conclusive DNA evidence of 
the suspect’s innocence, could outweigh that identification 
and preclude a finding of probable cause.29   
 
 Here, by contrast, all the booking sheet shows is that 
Goodwin was incarcerated beginning on September 26, 2009.  
It does not say when he was released.  The fact that the “time 
released” line is left blank is of no moment, since the 
document itself is undated.  The detectives in this case simply 
could not infer from the booking sheet itself that Goodwin 
remained incarcerated through [], the date of the first drug 
buy.   
 
 Thus the fact that Defendants were aware of this 
booking sheet is insufficient to show that Defendants 
submitted the warrant application with a reckless disregard 
for the “truth” that Goodwin could not have been Snipe.  To 
the contrary, the booking sheet supports the connection 
between Goodwin and Snipe because it lists Goodwin’s 
nickname as “Snipe.”  The physical description of Goodwin 
in the booking sheet also closely matches the physical 
description of Snipe in Detective Conway’s investigation 
report.  If anything, then, the booking sheet is inculpatory, 
                                              
28 Id. at 223. 
29 Wilson, 212 F.3d at 790. 
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and supports rather than undermines a probable cause 
determination.   
 
 Second, the booking sheet did not trigger a duty to 
further investigate Goodwin’s release date.  We have 
explained that the reliability of information provided to 
officials may sometimes be questionable enough to “put a 
reasonable official on notice that further investigation [is] 
necessary.”30  Even so, the official may still rely on the 
information unless the further investigation “would give rise 
to an obvious reason to doubt the accuracy of the 
information,”31 so as to “render[] the [official’s] reliance upon 
that information unreasonably reckless.”32   
 
 In light of the information Defendants had at the time, 
there was no reason for them to further investigate Goodwin’s 
release date.  Another law enforcement officer unconnected to 
the investigation suggested that Snipe may be Rashied 
Goodwin, and Detective Lissner “immediately” made a 
positive photo identification of Goodwin.  Goodwin makes 
much of the fact that Detective Lissner made this photo 
identification under “highly suggestive” circumstances.  
While this argument may be relevant to evidence suppression 
at a criminal trial, it is not relevant to the probable cause 
determination here.33  Thus, Defendants had sufficient 
                                              
30 United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 385 (3d Cir. 2006). 
31 Id. at 386. 
32 Id. at 385. 
33 See, e.g., Robinson v. Cook, 706 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(“[W]e think it unwise to expand the Brathwaite framework 
[for unduly suggestive identifications] from ‘a rule of 
evidence to a rule of damages’ by applying it in an arrestee’s 
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information in front of them to conclude that the drug dealer 
was Goodwin. 
 
 We note that it may be advisable for officers to 
investigate further in other circumstances.  For example, if the 
officers possessed more concrete evidence that the suspect 
was released on the exact date of the crime he allegedly 
committed but were unsure of the exact time of release, or if 
there was no photo identification involved, further inquiry 
might be necessary.  But here, all the booking sheet told 
Defendants was that Goodwin was in custody [] before the 
date of the first drug buy.  While this may have raised 
suspicion as to Goodwin’s whereabouts around the time of 
the first drug buy, it did not undermine probable cause given 
the other information Defendants had in their possession at 
the time. 
 
 Because Goodwin has not set forth sufficient proof 
that Defendants deliberately or recklessly disregarded the 
truth when they submitted the warrant application to secure 
his arrest warrant, Defendants are entitled to qualified 
immunity on his false imprisonment claim. 
B.  Malicious Prosecution 
 
 Goodwin must also show lack of probable cause to 
prevail on his malicious prosecution claim.34  We have 
already held that probable cause existed here.  Moreover, a 
                                                                                                     
civil suit alleging that probable cause was undermined by an 
unreliable identification.” (quoting Phillips v. Allen, 668 F.3d 
912, 915 (7th Cir. 2012))). 
34 Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521-22 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
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grand jury issued an indictment against Goodwin for the same 
charges for which he was arrested, which “constitutes prima 
facie evidence of probable cause to prosecute.”35  Thus, 
Goodwin’s malicious prosecution claim likewise fails and 
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. 
 
IV. 
 
 No one disputes that, had Defendants possessed and 
ignored plainly exculpatory evidence when submitting 
Goodwin’s warrant application, this would undermine if not 
eviscerate a finding of probable cause.  But that is not the 
case here.  The Plainfield booking sheet indicates that 
Goodwin was in custody [] before the date of the first drug 
deal in which he was allegedly involved.  At most, then, the 
booking sheet raised suspicion as to Goodwin’s whereabouts 
around that time, but it did not trigger an obligation that 
Defendants confirm his release date given the other 
information they possessed at the time.  Because we conclude 
that Defendants had probable cause to arrest and prosecute 
Goodwin, they are entitled to qualified immunity.  
                                              
35 Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir. 1989).  
Defendants argue that Goodwin’s grand jury indictment 
creates a rebuttable presumption of probable cause for all of 
his claims.  But Goodwin’s arrest occurred before the 
indictment, pursuant to an arrest warrant.  The presumption 
attaches only to the indictment and beyond, and thus has no 
bearing on an arrest that precedes the indictment.  See, e.g., 
Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1285 n.8 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(explaining that “a subsequent grand jury indictment does not 
retroactively provide probable cause for a false arrest that had 
already taken place”). 
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Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s denial of 
Defendants’ claim for qualified immunity with direction to 
enter judgment in favor of Defendants.  
